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EXCISE

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INQUIRE=DOC18D  
ITEM NO=00418984

ENVELOPE

CDSN = LGX666 MCN = 92196/32352 TOR = 921962059  
OTTZYUW RUEKJCS7450 1962102-CCCC--RUEALGX.  
ZNY CCCCC

HEADER

O 142102Z JUL 92  
FM JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC  
INFO RUEADWD/OCSA WASHINGTON DC  
RUENAAA/CNO WASHINGTON DC  
RUEAHQA/CSAF WASHINGTON DC  
RUEADWD/PTC WASH DC  
RUFQAID/USEUCOM AIDES VAIHINGEN GM  
RHLBAAA/USCINCSO QUARRY HEIGHTS PM  
RULSJGA/COGARD INTELCOORDCEN WASHINGTON DC  
RULKNIS/COMNISCOM WASHINGTON DC//NAVATAC//  
RUWTPGA/12 AF BERGSTROM AFB TX//IN//  
RUEOACC/CDRPSYOPGP FT BRAGG NC//AORC-POG-SB//  
RUANJTF/CJTF FOUR  
RUWANGC/CJTF FIVE//J20//  
RUWSMXI/AMC INTEL CEN SCOTT AFB IL//IN//  
RUCQVAB/USCINCSOC INTEL OPS CEN MACDILL AFB FL  
RUEOFAA/COMJSOC FT BRAGG NC//J2//  
RUWANTX/CJTF SIX  
RULKQAN/MARCORINTCEN QUANTICO VA  
RUEALGX/SAFE  
O 142055Z JUL 92  
FM AMEMBASSY LA PAZ  
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1429  
RUEHNA/DEAHQS WASHDC IMMEDIATE  
INFO RUEHIA/USIA WASHDC PRIORITY 2850  
RUEADWW/DIRONDCP WASHDC PRIORITY  
RUEADWW/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY  
BT

CONTROLS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 LA PAZ 011308

DEPT FOR ARA AS ARONSON, INM AS LEVITSKY  
DEA FOR OC AND OF; NSC FOR BEERS; ONDCP FOR PORTER

E.O. 12356: DECL:OADR

/\*\*\*\*\* THIS IS A COMBINED MESSAGE \*\*\*\*\*/

BODY

TAGS: PREL, SNAR, PGOV, PINR, BL  
SUBJECT: GOB MININT SAAVEDRA'S WASHINGTON VISIT

REFS: A) ARA/AND-EMBASSY TELECON, 7/13/92  
- B) LA PAZ 11145, C) LA PAZ 11240  
- D) AMBASSADOR-BONNER TELECON, 7/14/92

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IS/FPC/CDR *lm* Date: *5/24/95*

|                     |                                            |                                                        |
|---------------------|--------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------|
| DEPARTMENT OF STATE | <input type="checkbox"/> RELEASE           | <input type="checkbox"/> DECLASSIFY                    |
|                     | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> EXCISE | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> DECLASSIFY IN PART |
|                     | <input type="checkbox"/> DENY              | <input type="checkbox"/> DELETE Non-Responsive Info    |
|                     | <input type="checkbox"/> FOIA Exemptions   | <input type="checkbox"/> PA Exemptions                 |

MR Cases Only: EO Citations

TS authority to:

☐ CLASSIFY as ☐ S or ☐ C OADR  
☐ DOWNGRADE TS to ☐ S or ☐ C OADR

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1. CONFIDENTIAL -- ENTIRE TEXT.

2. FURTHER TO REF A, THE FOLLOWING ARE BACKGROUND AND TALKING POINTS FOR GOB INTERIOR MINISTER CARLOS SAAVEDRA'S JULY 15-17 VISIT TO WASHINGTON. SOME OF THIS INFORMATION MAY HAVE BEEN INCLUDED ALREADY IN BRIEFING MATERIALS PREPARED IN WASHINGTON:

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BACKGROUND  
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3. SAAVEDRA WILL PORTRAY GOB COUNTERNARCOTICS (CN) EFFORTS IN THE BEST POSSIBLE LIGHT, SEEKING TO GAIN MAXIMUM CREDIT FOR SUCH ACCOMPLISHMENTS AS THE SUCCESSFUL ON-GOING OPERATION "GHOST ZONE" AND THE JULY 10 EXTRADITION OF ASUNTA ROCA SUAREZ (REF B). HE LIKELY WILL PLAY DOWN LESS SUCCESSFUL ENDEAVORS SUCH AS COCA ERADICATION AND THE LIGHT SENTENCES GIVEN THUS FAR TO THE SURRENDERED TRAFFICKERS.

4. SAAVEDRA TOLD THE AMBASSADOR ON JULY 13 THAT HE HAD THREE MAIN OBJECTIVES:

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B1

B1  
B5

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SPECIFIC ISSUE TALKING POINTS  
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7. ERADICATION: THE PACE OF VOLUNTARY ERADICATION  
INCREASED SOMEWHAT IN JUNE 4 BUT GOB COMMITMENT TO ERADICATION  
REMAINS IN QUESTION. 1

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-- THE GOB CANNOT EXPECT TO ACHIEVE ITS GOALS WITHOUT SOME  
SORT OF ENFORCED PENALTY FOR GROWING ILLEGAL COCA.

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-- THE GOB CANNOT EXPECT THE SAME LEVELS OF USG ASSISTANCE IF BOLIVIAN ERADICATION EFFORTS DO NOT EVEN REACH THE MINIMUM (5000 HA) STANDARD ESTABLISHED BY BOLIVIAN LAW.

-- USG "FLEXIBILITY" ON COCA ERADICATION AS A MEASURE OF CN SUCCESS DOES NOT MEAN THAT ERADICATION IS IGNORED. ERADICATION CAN BE PUT IN CONTEXT, BUT IT CANNOT BE DROPPED AS A MEASURE OF CN SUCCESS.

-- THE GOB MAY PREFER A LOWER ESF-LINKED COCA ERADICATION TARGET (WHICH WOULD RESULT IN LESS ESF) BUT THE OVERALL USG-GOB GOAL SHOULD BE THE SAME; A NET REDUCTION IN ILLEGAL COCA CULTIVATION.

8. EXTRADITION: THE ASUNTA ROCA SUAREZ EXTRADITION WAS AN IMPORTANT FIRST STEP, ESTABLISHING A CLEAR BOLIVIAN LEGAL PRECEDENT TO BE USED IN THE OTHER PENDING EXTRADITIONS, NO MATTER HOW THE PERSONNEL ON THE SUPREME COURT CHANGE IN THE FUTURE.

-- WE ARE DISMAYED, HOWEVER, THAT BLANCA SUAREZ WAS LET OFF IN A BLATANTLY POLITICAL DEAL.

-- WE ARE ALSO DISMAYED THAT ASUNTA'S EXIT WAS ALLOWED TO BE TURNED INTO AN UNNECESSARY, UNAVOIDABLE MEDIA CIRCUS.

-- THE SENSATIONAL TREATMENT GIVEN HER DEPARTURE SHOULD NOT BE USED AS AN EXCUSE TO AVOID FUTURE EXTRADITIONS. OUR GOVERNMENTS SHOULD JOINTLY DEVELOP BETTER PROCEDURES FOR FUTURE EXTRADITIONS.

-- ALTHOUGH ASUNTA'S EXTRADITION PROVED THAT THE 1900 TREATY/1988 CONVENTION LEGAL FRAMEWORK COULD WORK, A BILATERAL EXTRADITION TREATY, AS CALLED FOR BY A NUMBER OF GOB OFFICIALS AND POLITICIANS, IS OUR PREFERRED SOLUTION. WE ARE SEEKING SUCH TREATIES WITH A NUMBER OF OTHER NATIONS, NOT ONLY BOLIVIA.

9. SURRENDEREES: WE ARE DISAPPOINTED BY THE LIGHT SENTENCES GIVEN THE SURRENDEREES THUS FAR.

-- WE UNDERSTAND THAT THE ISSUE IS IN THE HANDS OF THE SUPERIOR AND SUPREME COURT FOR REVIEW, BUT IF THE GOB IS SERIOUS ABOUT PUNISHING THESE MAJOR TRAFFICKERS AND SHOWING THE WORLD THAT IT IS SERIOUS ABOUT THE DRUG WAR, THE GOB EXECUTIVE BRANCH SHOULD DO ALL IT CAN THROUGH THE APPEAL PROCESS TO ENSURE THAT THESE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINALS ARE GIVEN PUNISHMENTS COMMENSURATE WITH THEIR CRIMES. SIMPLY TAKING THESE MEN OUT OF CIRCULATION FOR A WHILE IS NOT ENOUGH.

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-- THE GOB MAY CLAIM THAT IT CAN DO NO MORE ON THESE CASES UNTIL THE COURTS DECIDE, BUT THE BOTTOM LINE IS THE SAME: THESE TRAFFICKERS DID NOT COMPLY WITH THE TERMS OF THE SURRENDER DECREE ESTABLISHED BY THE GOB.

10. DEA AGREEMENT: WE ARE STILL WAITING FOR A GOB RESPONSE TO OUR DRAFT AGREEMENT OF JUNE 12, WHICH IS IN MANY WAYS SIMILAR TO THE SO-CALLED "MEXICO MODEL" PREFERRED BY SOME IN THE GOB.

-- THE MEXICO AGREEMENT CANNOT BE APPLIED WORD-FOR-WORD IN BOLIVIA; THE CN COOPERATION SITUATIONS ARE DIFFERENT IN MEXICO AND BOLIVIA.

-- WE ARE CONFIDENT, HOWEVER, THAT WE CAN JOINTLY (AND QUICKLY) CRAFT AN ACCEPTABLE AGREEMENT, WHICH WE HAVE BEEN SEEKING LONG BEFORE THE JULY 11 SHOOTING IN SANTA CRUZ. THAT UNFORTUNATE INCIDENT ONLY UNDERScoreD THE NEED FOR SUCH AN AGREEMENT, WHICH IS IN BOTH OUR GOVERNMENTS' INTERESTS.

/\*\*\*\*\* BEGINNING OF SECTION 003 \*\*\*\*\*/

11. ARMY CN ROLE: WE JUST COMPLETED A CN MILITARY ASSISTANCE AGREEMENT (FY92 ANNEX III) THAT IS ACCEPTABLE TO THE BOLIVIAN MILITARY.

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-- AS WE STRESSED DURING OUR OPEN, FRANK NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE BOLIVIAN MILITARY ON THAT ANNEX, FUNDING LIMITATIONS AND THE GOB'S POLITICAL DECISION NOT TO GIVE THE ARMY AN ACTIVE CN ROLE MOTIVATED OUR DECISION TO CUT OUT SUPPORT FOR AN ENGINEERING BATTALION IN FY92.

-- WE SIMPLY CANNOT PROVIDE EQUIPMENT (I.E., THE CN-LINKED ENGINEERING BATTALION) ON THE BASIS OF PROMISES ALONE. IF THE BOLIVIAN MILITARY IS PERMITTED TO PLAY AN ACTIVE CN ROLE WITH ITS EXISTING RESOURCES (E.G., SMALLER CIVIC ACTION TEAMS IN THE CHAPARE; BORDER PATROLS TO INTERDICT PRECURSOR CHEMICALS), WE CAN RE-EVALUATE THE ENGINEERING BATTALION ISSUE, RESOURCES PERMITTING, IN FY93.

BOWERS  
ADMIN  
BT

#7452

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